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RECENT CASE NOTES
able,18 but the court in the principal case appears correct in rejecting such
objection on the ground that the corporation was adequately protected.19 The
court's ruling in the principal case against that part of the decree ordering
payment of dividends in the future in event of profits seems correct. A court
of equity should not compel a declaration of dividends until after the board of
directors has exercised its discretion and an abuse of such discretion has been
shown.
W. S. H.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-APPEALS FROM ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS.-Plaintiff,
an Indiana corporation organized to engage in the small loan business, sought
to avoid the provisions of an Act of 1933 reducing interest rates and placing
the small loan business under the control of the Department of Financial Institutions. 1 The complaint in part charged that the act was invalid because it
made no provision for an appeal to a court for a judicial determination of the
questions involved. Held the validity of an act subjecting businesses of a
certain character to rules and regulations of a non-judicial body does not depend
upon provisions granting or failing to grant an appeal to the courts. Financial
Aid Corporationv. Wallace (Ind. 1939), 23 N. E. (2d) 472.
Generically speaking, due process is not necessarily judicial process, nor is
the right of appeal essential to due process of law.2 The right of appeal is not
an inherent or inalienable right, except where expressly guaranteed by the
State Constitution. 3
The general rule is that appeals are recognized as allowable only from
judicial decisions, and administrative tribunals or departments do not ordinarily
render judicial decisions. 4 A fundamental principle underlying the right of
appeal in all cases is, that in the absence of express statutory provision to the
contrary, the decision appealed from must have been made by a tribunal or
officer vested with judicial authority, and while acting in a judicial capacity. 5
It has repeatedly been held that an appeal will not be allowed to the courts
from the purely ministerial or administrative action of a public officer, board,
commission, or similar tribunal, without express statutory authority. 6 The court
held in the principal case that the act conferred administrative, and not judicial,
7
authority.
28 Gesell v. Thomahawk Land Co. (1924), 184 Wis. 555, 200 N. W. 550.
19 Stevens v. U. S. Steel Corp. (1905), 68 N. E. Eq. 373, 59 Ati. 905.
1 Chapter 154 of the Acts of the General Assembly of 1933, p. 806, amending
Chapter 125 of the Acts of 1917, p. 401, secs. 18-3001 to 18-3005, Burns' Indiana
Statutes 1933; sec. 10465 to sec. 10469, Baldwin's 1934.
2
Reetz v. Michigan (1903), 188 U. S. 505, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 390.
3 In re Petition to Transfer Appeals (1931), 202 Ind. 365, 174 N. E. 812.
4 Ferner v. State (1898), 151 Ind. 247, 51 N. E. 360.
5 U. S. v. Ferreira (1851), 13 How. 40, 14 L. Ed. 42; Indianapolis v. Hawkins
(1913), 180 Ind. 382, 103 N. E. 10; Board v. Davis (1894), 136 Ind. 503, 22
L. R. A. 515.
OSims v. Monroe Co. (1872), 39 Ind. 40; Farley v. Hamilton Co. (1890),
126 Ind. 468, 26 N. E. 174; Cushman v. Hussey (1917), 187 Ind. 228, 118 N. E.
816; State Board v. Ort (1925), 84 Ind. App. 260, 151 N. E. 31.
7 "An administrative officer charged with the administration of the laws
enacted by the General Assembly necessarily exercises a discretion partaking
of the characteristics of the judicial department of the government, but does
not have the force and effect of a judgment." Financial Aid Corporation v.
Wallace (Ind. 1939), 23 N. E. (2d) 472, 475.
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The failure of an act setting up an administrative tribunal to provide
expressly for an appeal to the courts does not invalidate the act.8 Without
such provision, there are other remedies available where the tribunal has
misused its authority. An appropriate mode of obtaining relief is to proceed by
a bill in equity to restrain the enforcement of the order. 9 Mandamus will lie
to redress any wrong which is suffered through any arbitrary, tyrannical, or
unreasonable action on the part of the officer or tribunal, or any action based
on false information.' 0 So long as the act does not expressly deny the right of
access to the courts to determine any matter which would be the appropriate
subject of judicial inquiry, the act is valid, though no provision is made for
appeal."1 The courts are presumably open to the complainant to test the constitutionality of any administrative order.' 2 In the principal case the complainant came to court under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, praying
13
that Chapter 154 be declared unconstitutional and void.
It is important to note, however, that if the complainant claims confiscation
of his property will result from any order of an administrative board, the state
must provide a fair opportunity for submitting that issue to a judicial tribunal;' 4
and the judicial tribunal will review the question de novo.1 5 In those cases
which so held, the court declared statutes invalid although they expressly provided the right of appeal, on the grounds that to exercise the right the complainant was forced to suffer such great hardship that it was in fact a denial
of due process.6 An opportunity to be heard must be given to him who claims
that unconstitutional deprivation of his property is resulting from an administrative order; if that opportunity is given by express provision in the statute,
or without that, by the remedies suggested above, the statute of which he complains remains valid.
8 Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Garrett (1913), 231 U. S. 298, 34 Sup. Ct.
48; Cofman v. Ousterhous (1918), 40 N. D. 390, 168 N. W. 826; Reetz v.
Michigan (1903), 188 U. S. 505, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 390; Ferner v. State (1898),
151 Ind. 247, 51 N. E. 360.
9 Chicago R. Co. v. Minnesota (1889), 134- U. S. 418, 459, 460; St. Louis &
S. F. R. Co. v. Gill (1894), 156 U. S. 649, 659, 666; Ex parte Young (1907),
209 U. S. 123, 166.
10 Cofman v. Ousterhous (1918), 40 N. D. 390, 168 N. W. 826; People ex
rel. Lodes v. Health Department (1907), 189 N. Y. 187, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 894,
82 N. E. 187. In Metcalse v. State Board (1900), 123 Mich. 661, 82 N. W. 512,
application for mandamus to compel the state medical board to register the
petitioner was entertained, and although the application was denied, yet the
denial was based not upon a want of jurisdiction in the court but upon the
merits.
11 Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Garrett (1913), 231 U. S. 298, 34 S. Ct. 48.
12 Home Telephone Co. v. Los Angeles (1908), 211 U. S. 265, 278. In the
principal case the court said, "If an administrative officer undertakes to perform
any unauthorized act, an action will lie in court enjoining, prohibiting, or
mandating him in the performance of administrative acts." See also Oklahoma
Operating Co. v. Love (1919), 252 U. S. 331, 40 S. Ct. 338.
13 Burns' Ind. St. Ann. (1933), sec. 3-1116.
14 Ohio Valley Co. v. Ben Avon Borough (1919), 253 U. S. 287, 40 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 527; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Tucker (1913), 230 U. S. 340, 347; Wadly
Southern Ry. Co. v. Georgia (1915), 235 U. S. 651, 660, 661; Ex parte Young
(1907), 209 U. S. 123, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 441.
15 Crowell v. Benson (1930), 45 F. (2d) 66.
16 Supra, note 14. See particularly Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love (1919),
252 U. S. 331, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 338.
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The presence or absence of an appeal provision, therefore, is of no material
consequence, so long as the complainant has in fact the opportunity to test the
constitutionality of orders issued under the statute. In the principal case, the
complainant did have that opportunity, for, as was pointed out by the court,
the complainant was even then "present in court questioning acts of the department and the authority granted by the legislature."
W. D. B.

